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1 INTRODUCTION

Language socialization is a theoretical and methodological paradigm concerned with the acquisition of what Pierre Bourdieu called *habitus*, or ways of being in the world.¹ It was articulated and developed in the 1980s (Ochs and Schieffelin 1984; Schieffelin and Ochs 1986a) as a response to two significant absences in (a) the developmental psycholinguistic literature on language acquisition and (b) the anthropological literature on child socialization. In the first case – the literature on language acquisition – the absence at issue was that of culture. In other words, studies of first language acquisition proceeded as though there were particular sociolinguistic practices that facilitated children's acquisition of language (for example, the existence of a simplified "baby talk" register). Linguists asserted that those practices, which they observed in their subjects and enacted themselves, must be universal and necessary conditions of first language acquisition.² What went unremarked was the fact that the overwhelming majority of studies of language acquisition were studies of white, middle-class North American and northern European children. That is to say, they were studies of children and caregivers who shared not only the linguistic but also the sociocultural backgrounds of the scholars who studied them. For this reason, culture remained invisible as a principle that organized speech practices and their acquisition.

It took anthropological studies of language acquisition in non-Western communities³ and non-middle-class white and African American communities in the United States (e.g., Miller 1986; Ward 1971; Heath 1983) to demonstrate that aspects of language acquisition assumed to be universal were in fact variable. Many assumed prerequisites, such as simplified registers or extensive repetition and paraphrase, turned out not to be necessary for the acquisition of language.

In studies of child socialization, researchers proceeded as if language was irrelevant. Classic works, of which Margaret Mead's books on growing up in Samoa and New Guinea are the best known (Mead 1954 [1928], 1930), examined socialization as a kind of behaviorist installing of cultural values into children. The Culture and

Personality School worked with the concept of "enculturation," not "socialization." Indeed, the term "socialization" was purposely chosen by the founders of language socialization studies precisely to differentiate and distance their project from that of scholars like Mead.⁴ A problem with "enculturation" was that it implied no participation or agency on the part of the child, who was simply an empty vessel into which culture was poured. Another problem was that the enculturation of children was largely assumed to be complete by the time a child reached puberty (conveniently marked by rites of passages in many societies); thus adolescence was often treated as a time when one then began enculturating others. In addition, Mead and her colleagues were more interested in documenting *that* enculturation processes were different in different societies. *How* exactly those processes differed was not their concern. And most seriously, the role that language played in the acquisition of cultural practices and cultural competencies was not imagined to be a problem in its own right. Indeed, reading Mead's work, and many other later anthropological studies of how children "acquire culture," one is left with the impression that language plays little or no role in socializing contexts. In most studies, language is largely disregarded as an aspect of social life. Children acquire habitus and become competent members of their societies through what seems like an unproblematic and predictable process of mimesis.

The language socialization paradigm addresses the lack of culture in language acquisition studies, and the absence of language in child socialization studies by insisting that in becoming competent members of their social groups, children are socialized through language, and they are socialized to use language. Hence, language is not just one dimension of the socialization process; it is the most central and crucial dimension of that process. The language socialization paradigm makes the strong claim that any study of socialization that does not document the role of language in the acquisition of cultural practices is not only incomplete. It is fundamentally flawed.

Language socialization studies should fulfill three criteria. They should be ethnographic in design, longitudinal in perspective, and they should demonstrate the acquisition (or not) of particular linguistic and cultural practices over time and across contexts. These criteria are important to bear in mind when considering whether or not a particular perspective is a language socialization perspective, or if it is a study of language and social interaction. One of the claims made in the books and articles that founded the language socialization paradigm was that "all interactions are potentially socializing contexts" (Schieffelin 1990: 19; Ochs 1988: 6). This was asserted in response to "enculturation" studies, which implied that cultural competence was largely complete after adolescence. It was also stressed to upend the behaviorist implications of previous work on child socialization. The claim was meant to highlight the socializing nature of all human interaction so that attention might be focused on the ways in which subjectivities, stances, and positions are negotiated and achieved, not given. So in mother-child interactions, it is not only the child who is being socialized – the child, through its actions and verbalizations, is also actively (if not necessarily consciously) socializing the mother as a mother. Co-workers socialize one another as co-workers. Lovers socialize one another as lovers. And so on. The point was that multiple agencies are present – and should be accounted for – in any social interaction. These days, the claim about all interactions being potentially

socializing contexts could easily be taken to mean that all interactions performatively make

What happened, however, is that the language socializing contexts has given license to those who are conducting "language socialization" studies. Studying is language and social interaction. In addition to microanalytical studies of language, researchers have sought to ethnographize the social activity "by constantly informing the audience of what to happen next" (McDermott, 1992). In this way, a great deal we can learn about socialization is lost to caution against claiming that language socialization study. As we just reviewed, language socializing contexts. But to call socialization studies the brief of the paradigm so far the distinctiveness.

That distinctiveness lies in the inclusion of long-term ethnography, and its focus on how practices become acquired (or not) by children. Perhaps the most important contribution of the paradigm, namely, a processual account of language and culturally intelligible subjects. In this way, again, was really "Do people vary in how they ask a different question: "How do children come into being?"

Because the central question has been the form of ethnomethodology, and the development of methodological tools developed by Sacks and Emanuel Schegloff. However, the paradigm is only interested in the details of what is going on in systems" (Sacks, Schegloff, and Gail, 1992). Instead, language socialization studies focus on socialization to local social structures (Sacks, 1992). Processes. For example, Don Kulick's study of Papua New Guinea linked routine socialization to the loss of the local language in the process of proletarianization (Kulick 1992). Inegalitarian societies also demonstrate that even the remotest of villages are influenced by the world that extend far beyond the scope of the local.

One of the never-remedied problems with Bourdieu's formulations of habitus is that they are about the performative power of language, or the early reiterations of language as an intelligible subject, are assumed to be unproblematic. So, once again, we know that we assume a habitus, and we know that

socializing contexts could easily be framed in the language of performativity theory: all interactions performatively materialize different kinds of subjects.

What happened, however, is that the idea that all interactions are potentially socializing contexts has given license to a wide range of researchers to claim they are conducting "language socialization" studies, when in our view what they are studying is language and social interaction. This may be due to the increased attention to microanalytical studies of social interaction involving experts and novices, as researchers have sought to ethnographically document how people manage concerted activity "by constantly informing and conforming each other to whatever it is that has to happen next" (McDermott, Gospodinoff, and Aron 1978: 246). There is clearly a great deal we can learn about social life from studies like these. However, we want to caution against claiming that every analysis of social encounters is a language socialization study. As we just reaffirmed, all social interactions are in some sense socializing contexts. But to call studying them "language socialization" is to stretch the brief of the paradigm so far that it risks losing its theoretical and methodological distinctiveness.

That distinctiveness lies in the investment of the language socialization paradigm in long-term ethnography, and its focus on how particular culturally meaningful practices become acquired (or not) by children and other novices. This leads us to what is perhaps the most important contribution that such studies can offer anthropology; namely, a processual account of how individuals come to be particular kinds of culturally intelligible subjects. In a sense, this was Mead's concern. But her question, again, was really "Do people vary cross-culturally?" Language socialization studies ask a different question: "How do different kinds of culturally specific subjectivities come into being?"

Because the central question here is *how*, the language socialization paradigm is a form of ethnomethodology, and is deeply indebted to the theoretical insights and methodological tools developed by such scholars as Howard Garfinkel, Harvey Sacks, and Emanuel Schegloff. However, because it is also a form of anthropology, it is not only interested in the details of what Conversation Analysts call "local management systems" (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974; Keating and Egbert, this volume). Instead, language socialization studies are careful to link the micropractices of socialization to local social structures (such as gender and rank) and to larger, globalizing processes. For example, Don Kulick's study of language shift in a small village in Papua New Guinea linked routines that caregivers used in speaking to babies to the loss of the local language in the face of colonialism, modernity, and encroaching proletarianization (Kulick 1992). Later studies of language socialization in multilingual societies also demonstrate how the languages that children acquire in the remotest of villages are influenced by sociopolitical and economic processes that extend far beyond the scope of the local setting (Garrett 1999; Paugh 2001).

One of the never-remedied (or even adequately addressed) weaknesses in Bourdieu's formulations of habitus, and, more recently, in Judith Butler's claims about the performative power of language, has been that the socialization of habitus, or the early reiterations of language that initiate processes of becoming a culturally intelligible subject, are assumed and asserted more than they are actually demonstrated. So, once again, we know *that* they happen – we know that children come to assume a habitus, and we know that the performative process of boy-ing or girl-ing

occurs in socializing contexts – but we don't know *how*. Because the “how” part of these processes remains vague, both Bourdieu and Butler have been repeatedly charged with theorizing reproduction, not change, and entrenching a behaviorist theory of subjectivity, where everyone miraculously becomes what they are supposed to become. We remain agnostic on whether this charge accurately characterizes Bourdieu's work, and we think it is wrong when it comes to Butler. But it is clear that the charge can arise because both theorists pay so little attention to actual socialization practices. Here is where language socialization studies have enormous potential for enriching social theory. By analyzing ways in which praxis comes to be acquired, and performativity actually operates in situated interactions, language socialization studies can document not only how and when practices are acquired, but also how and when they are acquired differently from what was intended, or not acquired at all. Hence, reproduction is not assumed, and unintended consequences of socializing practices, or change, can be documented and accounted for in empirically delineated social contexts.

Programmatic statements about the intellectual history, scope, and goals of the language socialization paradigm can be found in a number of publications.⁵ A comprehensive review of two decades of language socialization studies has also recently appeared (Garrett and Baquedano-López 2002). Therefore, instead of offering an overview of the field, we want to illustrate the power of the paradigm by concentrating here on work that demonstrates how different kinds of culturally intelligible subjectivities come into being. The dimensions of subjectivity that interest us most here are desire and fear. In anthropological work, desires and fears are usually addressed under the rubric of “affect,” defined broadly as emotion, feelings, moods, dispositions, and attitudes associated with persons and/or situations (Ochs and Schieffelin 1989: 7).

Affect is a central dimension of any theory of becoming, regardless of whether the theory is a scholarly one or a local one. Everyone has ideas about and conventions for displaying, invoking, and interpreting affect. Scholarly work on the topic of affect has consisted of endless debates about whether the conventionalized displays of affective stances actually correspond with, or provide a window into, the “real” feelings of the people who produce the displays. This concern with surface and depth is a profoundly Western problematic, one that has arisen from a long history of meditation on supposedly fundamental binaries (presence versus absence, body versus soul, mind versus body, conscious versus unconscious, etc.). Many social groups do not hypostasize these dichotomies, and they do not recognize, or they have different ideas about, the relationship between the display of an affective stance and the inner sensation that the stance conventionally indexes (Lutz and White 1986). In other words: many groups do not expect or demand sincerity. Whether or not a person “really means” what she or he says or does is not a topic for speculation. In true performative manner, the invocation of a conventionalized affective sign (laughing, or crying, or saying “I'm sorry”) is the doing of that emotion, and nobody cares much, or even considers, whether or not that doing corresponds with some privately felt sensation (Besnier 1990; Irvine 1990).

As Hymes (1974) recognized long ago, affect is a core characteristic of communicative competence. Hence the ability to display culturally intelligible affective stances is a crucial dimension of the process of becoming a recognizable subject in any social

group. Language socialization practices are attributed to infants, and how caregivers react to them.

One striking example comes from a village of Gapun as described by Schieffelin (1990: 100). “Headed.” Caregivers react with surprise and anger. A child cries out and asks “Ai! What are you doing?” *mnda*, and *ayata* – we are doing it,” respectively. If a mother tells the child to pet it. In response, the mother asserts “Look, get closer to the animal, touch it!” her “That's it, hit it!” and anyone tending them. In response, the caregiver biting her and raising the heel of her foot inches of the child's face. In response, of these punches, the child hits her and body with her own foot.

Given these kinds of interactions, caregivers discover that anger is an important component of the village culture. It is selfish and always reacts where women who are angry at persons whom they fear. They express their anger for the group. In the village conviction that they cause them, their anger is a censorcell one and cause.

The Kaluli, another group, have children that strongly react to stubborn, infants and children which translates as loud sounds produced by the child. *bo*, ‘mother’ and ‘brother’ view of language, expressed in a way that is central to its culture. They get what they want, but the lexicon or simplified vocabulary mothers begin to say *a:la:ma* ‘say it’, to an assertive demeanor of the children are understood. Attention to what the mothers make extend

group. Language socialization studies have demonstrated that these affective stances are attributed to infants from very early on, and that these attributed stances influence how caregivers react to children, and how children come to act and speak.

One striking example of this is the way that caregivers in the Papua New Guinean village of Gapun assume that infants are naturally stubborn, willful, and "big-headed." Caregivers routinely interpret infants' actions as expressing dissatisfaction and anger. A child cooing softly in its mother's lap is likely to be shaken suddenly and asked "Ai! What are you mad about?!" The first words attributed to a baby are *oki*, *mnda*, and *ayata* – words which mean "I'm leaving," "I'm sick of this," and "Stop it," respectively. If a mother notices a baby reaching out toward a dog, she won't tell the child to pet it. Instead, voicing what she takes to be the child's inner state, the mother asserts "Look, she's mad now, she wants to hit the dog," and she moves closer to the animal, thrusting out the child's hand onto the dog's fur, encouraging her "That's it, hit it! Hit it!" Imputed aggression in babies is frequently matched by anyone tending them, and the most common mode of face play with babies involves the caregiver biting her lower lip, widening her eyes, thrusting out her chin sharply, and raising the heel of her hand in a threatening manner, swinging it to within a few inches of the child's face and then suddenly pulling it back again. After pulling several of these punches, the woman or man doing this laughs at the baby and nuzzles its face and body with her or his lips (Kulick 1992: 99–104).

Given these kinds of ideas about the nature of children, and these kinds of routine caregiver–child interactions that foreground anger, it should come as no surprise to discover that anger in Gapun is a structuring principle of social life. It is a crucial component of the village's gender division, for example, in that women are held to be selfish and always ready to publicly vent their anger (in verbal genres such as a *kros*, where women who feel wronged hurl vituperative monologues of abuse at the persons whom they feel have wronged them), whereas men are expected to suppress their anger for the greater social good. The salience of anger is also manifested in the village conviction that imposing on another person and making them angry may cause them, their ancestors, or the supernatural entities associated with their land to ensorcell one and cause one to sicken or die (Kulick 1992, 1993, 1998).

The Kaluli, another group in Papua New Guinea, hold beliefs about the nature of children that strongly contrast with Gapun notions and practices. Instead of willful or stubborn, infants and preverbal children are thought by Kaluli to be *taiyo* 'soft', which translates as helpless, vulnerable, and having no understanding. The first sounds produced by children and recognized by adults as Kaluli words are *no:* and *bo*, 'mother' and 'breast'. These words are significant in that they attest to a social view of language, expressing the child's primary relationship and the giving of food that is central to its constitution. Kaluli say children know how to beg and whine to get what they want, but they must be taught to use language. Kaluli use no baby talk lexicon or simplified speech, but once 'mother' and 'breast' are established, mothers begin to socialize young children using a speech prompting routine, *a:la:ma* 'say it', to elicit the repetition of specific speech forms that convey an assertive demeanor directed to others. So again in stark contrast to Gapun, Kaluli children are understood to need to *acquire* assertive demeanors. Often paying little attention to what the young child might want to do or say at a given point in time, mothers make extensive use of the "say it" routine to direct young children to

request, command, tease, and challenge. In so doing, they model what they want the child to say and how it should be said. They also make verbally explicit what they want the child to desire (some food, a particular object). A child's ability to repeat and ultimately produce such speech acts independently is crucial to the desired shift from being *taiyo* 'soft', to *halaido*: 'hard' – "hardness" being a potent cultural trope that signifies verbal and social competence. Once children are able to verbally demand, they too may be asked to give and share, and can enter into the system of reciprocity that defines Kaluli social life and relationships. This is one goal of language socialization in this "egalitarian" society, where the ability to know when to demand, and when to appeal to others to feel sorry and give, is crucial throughout the life cycle.

A final example we can mention in this context is the Hasidic Jewish community in New York that has been studied by Ayala Fader (2000). According to Hasidic belief, each person has a set of God-given inclinations, one for good (*yaytser hatoyv*) and one for evil (*yaytser hure*). Throughout life, these inclinations are expected to be acted upon – through prayer, self-control, obedience, and fulfillment of the commandments – so that the good inclinations keep the evil ones forever in check. Children enter this Hasidic world in a state of moral innocence. However, throughout infancy and childhood, they are guided or trained in managing their evil inclinations – manifested through immodesty, selfishness, and openly expressed desire – by caregivers' praising and shaming. Children do not receive the inclination for good until the age of 12 or 13, when they reach the transitional age of *bar/bas mitsve* and thereby become responsible for fulfilling all of the Jewish commandments. Before that time, children are not expected to independently exercise the self-control required for subsuming the inclination for evil to that for good.

Socialization in this community is aimed at making children aware of their *yaytser hure* (which they are told is like a little man within themselves who urges unacceptable speech, thought, and action) so that they can counteract it through acts of charity, compassion, and modesty. Because infants and young children are overwhelmingly concerned with physical needs, socialization practices encourage the more spiritual concerns valued in this community. These are accomplished through elaborate praising routines which encourage and prepare the child to form associations between parental love, communal acceptance, and conformity – all of which sets the stage for a more fulfilling relationship with God. For example, through *mevater* ('selflessness') routines, small children are encouraged to give in to another's wishes, and they are given small prizes or rewards when they do so. Children who do not conform are given a series of warnings and if they still do not comply, they are publicly shamed. While children do not grasp the larger spiritual implications of this system of pleasing others, they nonetheless experience culturally valorized emotions and rewards.

2 THE CHALLENGE OF "BAD SUBJECTS"

Framing the language socialization paradigm as we have done until now, and illustrating it with the examples we have chosen so far, it would be possible to conclude that language socialization can only account for culturally predictable outcomes. That is, it can effectively document reproduction. But what about unexpected or

undesirable outcomes, to be so modest and of majority of language socialization – they provide us with interpreting social reproduction focus on expected and examination of cases in that are not expected or document the acquisition to the charge that they

Documenting the ac odologically challenging fieldwork with the same document individual i restrictions and do or s all the time, and in fact one frequently sees no children, who, as novices

It is something else other novices come to "subjects" – that is, subjects particular, socially sanctioned heterosexuality are one females are socialized to value term, but a structure recognize or respond positions. (We discuss below.) Other examples value sensitivity, selfish people in societies that

There are several ways "bad subjects" would ization and culture. To ants" was not down anthropological study Margaret Mead (1954) problem, however, was thing produced by and Mead's saw it as the b went unsuppressed by

One might indeed a logical processes that and tests developed by that "bad subjects" a idiosyncratic caregiving arguments: the most e rapist-murderer, say –

undesirable outcomes, such as children raised in Hasidic families who don't turn out to be so modest and obedient? What about resistance? What about change? That the majority of language socialization studies have focused on reproduction is a strength – they provide us with methodological and analytical tools for investigating and interpreting social reproduction and affective continuity across generations. But the focus on expected and predictable outcomes is a weakness if there is not also an examination of cases in which socialization doesn't occur, or where it occurs in ways that are not expected or desired. To the extent that language socialization studies only document the acquisition of normatively sanctioned practices, they open themselves to the charge that they are merely behaviorism in new clothes.

Documenting the acquisition of normatively proscribed cultural practices is methodologically challenging, because to do so conclusively would involve extensive fieldwork with the same subjects spread over many years. After all, it is one thing to document individual interactions in which children, for example, transgress adult restrictions and do or say things incorrectly from an adult's perspective. This happens all the time, and in fact, one great value of documenting language socialization is that one frequently sees normally taken-for-granted cultural values overtly displayed to children, who, as novices, get things “wrong” (see Bailey, this volume).

It is something else entirely to convincingly document how certain children or other novices come to be what Louis Althusser (1971: 169) would call “bad subjects” – that is, subjects who do not recognize or respond to calls to behave in particular, socially sanctioned ways. Homosexuals in societies that expect and demand heterosexuality are one obvious type of “bad” subjects; tomboys in societies where females are socialized to be demure is another example. Note that “bad” here is not a value term, but a structural label. A subject is “bad” in Althusser's terms if it does not recognize or respond to socially powerful, coercive calls to inhabit certain subject positions. (We discuss the reasons why subjects are structurally able to be “bad” below.) Other examples of “bad” subjects would be social bores in societies that value sensitivity, selfish individuals in societies that stress generosity, mean or criminal people in societies that socialize cooperation, and so on.

There are several ways of approaching this issue. Traditionally, what we are calling “bad subjects” would have been treated as “deviants” – failures, the limit of socialization and culture. To the credit of earlier paradigms, the existence of such “deviants” was not downplayed or ignored. In the very first and still best-known anthropological study of socialization (*Coming of Age in Samoa*), for example, Margaret Mead (1954 [1928]) devoted an entire chapter to “deviant” girls. The problem, however, was the explanation: rather than understanding deviance as something produced by and essential to the social system in which it occurs, analyses like Mead's saw it as the bubbling up of an individual temperament that for some reason went unsuppressed by the “patterns of culture” into which that individual was born.

One might indeed argue that “bad subjects” are the product of individual psychological processes that are either unknowable, or knowable only through methods and tests developed by psychologists or neurologists. Or one might also hypothesize that “bad subjects” are overtly socialized as such, through negligence, abuse, or idiosyncratic caregiving practices. There is something to be said for both those arguments: the most extreme case of a “bad” subject that we can think of – a serial rapist-murderer, say – is clearly the product of a very particular psychological and

social history. But to particularize even a case as extreme as this ignores the fact that serial rapist-murderers are cultural products – they do not exist everywhere, as either a culturally imaginable subjectivity or as an actually occurring type of person; nor are they exclusively the children of negligent or abusive parents (see e.g. Cameron and Frazer 1987, 1994). Hence, even here, a cultural analysis is crucial, and a culturally sensitive understanding of socialization has the potential to illuminate key dimensions in the production of even the seemingly most unintelligible subjectivities.

The approach that we want to suggest for meeting the challenge of “bad” subjectivities is one that uses the methods and theories of the language socialization paradigm, but augments them to allow us to account for why socializing messages to behave and feel in particular ways may also produce their own inversion.

Before we proceed, however, we should perhaps say a few words about why we have been speaking about “subjects” and “subjectivities” rather than using terms like “person” or “personhood,” which are more common in both anthropology generally and the earlier literature on language socialization specifically (in our own work, for instance). In essence, the two different terminologies reference two different sets of debates. The debates about “persons” and “personhood” are anthropological debates, with roots in the Culture and Personality School’s project of showing how different societies promote the development of different temperamental patterns, and also in French sociology’s early concerns with the cultural production of “the notion of person” (Marcel Mauss’s classic essay (1985) of that name is of course central here). Debates about “subjects,” on the other hand, arise most directly from French post-structuralist thought. So if anthropological discussions tended to center on whether or not the (social) person was culturally imagined to be the same as the (individual) actor (e.g. La Fontaine 1985), or on how culturally competent persons came to be socialized in particular cultural settings (e.g. any of the socialization studies we have cited so far), French scholars like Althusser, Jacques Lacan, and Michel Foucault were interested in theorizing the processes by which individuals come to know themselves as such. Even though they used very different theoretical language (Althusser wrote about “interpellation,” Lacan discussed “identifications,” and Foucault elaborated what he called “subjectification” and “governmentality”), these thinkers were all committed to exploring the ways in which individuals not only come to inhabit particular culturally recognizable places in a social system, but also (a) how those places become made available to inhabit in the first place, and (b) how individuals come to desire to inhabit those subject positions, as opposed to others. This is what Butler, paraphrasing Foucault, means when she defines a subject as one who is “subjected to a set of social regulations, ... [in which] the law that directs those regulations reside[s] both as the formative principle of one’s sex, gender, pleasures, and desires and as the hermeneutic principle of self-interpretation” (1990: 96).

We now believe that the questions asked by French post-structuralists are more compelling, broader in scope, and suggestive in potential than anthropological discussions about persons and personhood. The theorists mentioned above explicitly thematize issues of desire, power, and positionality. In different ways, and to different extents, they also encourage an analysis of socialization: how do individuals come to perceive the subject positions that are available or possible in any given context? How is the taking up of particular positions enabled or blocked by relations of power?

How do particular positions become available to others are inconceivable.

The broader question is raised by the kind of data that socialization collect and analyze.

Throughout the 1980s, Billig elaborated an approach to social psychology. As Michel Foucault explains, discursive psychology analysis because it discloses

[d]iscursive psychology. Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of conversation analysis. outward accomplishment of discursive interaction phenomena. It argues that as “inner processes” and, accordingly, discursive psychology outward activity rather than states. (Billig 1997: 1)

A concrete example of a graph which reconsiders (Billig 1999). Repressed feelings, and emotion (disavowed), but also denied. In other words, desires, in fact often ignored, recognized, the act of Žižek (1999). Prohibited object and raised

Billig agrees with Lacan’s existence. But he disagrees with inborn urges, as Freud’s language: “in conversation learning to speak, child. This means two things. Instead, the constitutive interactional achievement

Billig stresses that he examines the ways in which dances, topic changes, socialization of polite behavior, speak politely, they are say *that* word’. All such forbidden phrases. ... (1999: 94, 95; emphasis)

How do particular positions come to be known as intelligible and desirable, while others are inconceivable and undesirable?

The broader question, though, is this: how can these kinds of issues be addressed by the kind of data that linguists and anthropologists interested in language socialization collect and analyze? The answer we suggest is as follows.

Throughout the 1990s, a group of British psychologists and social scientists elaborated an approach to social and psychological life that they call "discursive psychology." As Michael Billig, one of the group's most articulate proponents, explains, discursive psychology differs from orthodox social psychology and psychoanalysis because it discourages speculation about hidden, inner processes. Instead,

[d]iscursive psychology takes inspiration from the philosophical tradition of Wittgenstein's later philosophy and from the development of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. These traditions of analysis stress the need to examine in detail the outward accomplishment of social life, showing how social order is produced through discursive interaction. Discursive psychology applies this project to psychological phenomena. It argues that phenomena, which traditional psychological theories have treated as "inner processes" are, in fact, constituted through social, discursive activity. Accordingly, discursive psychologists argue that psychology should be based on the study of this outward activity rather than upon hypothetical, and essentially unobservable, inner states. (Billig 1997: 139–40)

A concrete example of what discursive psychology means in practice is Billig's monograph which reconsiders the Freudian concept of repression in terms of language (Billig 1999). Repression in Freudian theorizing is the idea that certain thoughts, feelings, and emotions are not only hidden and denied (or, as psychoanalysts say, disavowed), but also desired as a source of pleasure *because* they are hidden and denied. In other words, admonitions which are intended to discourage particular desires, in fact often incite and sustain them. As Freud and many others before him recognized, the act of prohibition is a crucial instigator of desire (see Freud 1989; Žižek 1999). Prohibition is always libidinally invested: it fixes desire on the prohibited object and raises the desire for transgression.

Billig agrees with Freud that repression is a fundamental dimension of human existence. But he disagrees with the idea that the roots of repression lie in biologically inborn urges, as Freud thought. Instead, he argues that repression is demanded by language: "in conversing, we also create silences," says Billig (1999: 261). Thus, in learning to speak, children also learn what must remain unspoken and unspeakable. This means two things: first, that repression is not beyond or outside language, but is, instead, the constitutive resource of language; and second, that repression is an interactional achievement.

Billig stresses that repression is accomplished in everyday interactions, and he examines the ways in which repudiations and disavowals are achieved through avoidances, topic changes, and direct commands. For example, in discussing the socialization of polite behavior, Billig remarks that "each time adults tell a child how to speak politely, they are indicating how to speak rudely. 'You must say *please*' . . . 'Don't say *that* word'. All such commands tell the child what rudeness is, pointing to the forbidden phrases. . . . [I]n teaching politeness, [adults provide] a model of rudeness" (1999: 94, 95; emphasis in original).

Although Billig does not situate his own work in the language socialization paradigm, his attention to socializing contexts and the constitutive role that language plays in those contexts invites us to consider the production of silences and desires from the perspective of language socialization. Paying attention to the role that the not-said or the unsayable plays in socializing contexts would enrich the language socialization paradigm, because it would compel analysis to go beyond surface readings of verbal interactions and explore the ways in which utterances necessarily manifest what Kulick (2003) has called "dual indexicality" – that is, they manifest both their surface propositional content and the simultaneous inverse of that content. Appreciation of dual indexicality in socializing contexts would wash away any residual ties to behaviorism that the language socialization paradigm might harbor, and it would encourage an active exploration of the formation of "bad" subjects. From this kind of perspective, the emergence of homosexual subjects, to take just one example, would not be mysterious or problematic in the slightest. Understanding that utterances always simultaneously manifest their inversion makes it possible to see that even in the most homophobic environments – *especially* in the most homophobic environments – messages about the possibility and desirability of homosexual subjectivity are continually conveyed, precisely by all the admonitions directed to children and others to not think or act *that* way. Paraphrasing Billig, we could say that in teaching hatred of homosexuals, adults provide a model of desire for them. Why a particular individual should come to inhabit a homosexual subjectivity will always remain difficult, if not impossible, to answer conclusively. But a study of language socialization in homophobic environments would provide invaluable empirical material about the ways in which particular forms of desire (desire to be or have something) are dialogically incited and socially circulated.

The circulation and incitement of desire is a topic currently being pursued in some of the most exciting work on language socialization now underway. This work does not draw on discursive psychology – indeed, just as the language socialization paradigm seems not to have yet made it over the Atlantic to discursive psychologists in the UK, discursive psychology seems largely unknown to US linguistic anthropologists working with language socialization data. However, we believe it should be, since the two paradigms share many of the same interests and analytical perspectives. A thoughtful amalgamation of the two would be extremely productive.

In the meantime, research is already being done which allows us to see how particular fears and desires are conveyed and acquired through recurring linguistic routines. An early article that examined this is Patricia Clancy's investigation of how Japanese children acquire what she calls communicative style; that is, "the way language is used and understood in a particular culture" (Clancy 1986: 213). Clancy was interested to see how children are socialized to command the strategies of indirection and intuitive understanding that characterize Japanese communicative style. In working with two-year-old children and their mothers, she discovered that these skills were acquired through early socialization routines in which mothers, among other practices, (a) juxtaposed indirect expressions (e.g. "It's already good") with direct ones ("No!"), thus conveying the idea that various forms of expression could be functionally equivalent; (b) attributed speech to others who had not actually spoken, thereby indicating to children how they should read non-verbal behavior; (c) appealed to the imagined reactions of *hito* 'other people', who are

supposedly always watching and affect-laden adjectives like "shy" or "fearful", making it clear that such kinds of communicative intentions are expectations which in adult interactions are expected of aged children to acquire the *hito* that undergird Japanese socialization.

The socialization of fear is the focus of their study of an agoraphobic child. Agoraphobia is a sense of having no control, gripped by paralyzing anxiety, and the child being unable to control one's movements. How this might occur by and through an agoraphobic woman, and how she managed to handle it, is the focus of the study. She often reframes her daughter's narrative as a feminist. She does this by portraying her daughter as a victim, no matter what the daughter's narrative, thereby reframing her daughter's narrative, thereby reframing her daughter's narrative, and by reframing situations in which her daughter has done something.

Although the studies by Clancy and Ochs are important to remember that it is important to remember that it is important to avoid shame, embarrassment, and humiliation. In this case, the desire is to come to develop taste. One of the different kinds of food are

In a comparison of dinner routines in Italian families, Ochs, Pontecorvo, and others were consistently marked by complaining that they did not like it, insisting that they must. One of the so oppositional is that they were assumed that children would not like it, could be signaled through the way others for the adults, or by the adults. For example, when one of the other might remark "I don't like it." In addition, the tenor of their children *want* to eat, and eat" (1996: 22, emphasis in original). Foods were portrayed as tasteless punishment ("Eat that celery").

Italian families, in contrast to the Japanese, their children to adopt a

supposedly always watching and evaluating the child's behavior; and (d) used strongly affect-laden adjectives like "scary" or "frightening" to describe a child's (mis)behavior, making it clear that such behavior is socially unacceptable and shameful. These kinds of communicative interactions sensitized children to subtle interactional expectations which in adult interactions are not expressed explicitly. They also encouraged children to acquire the specific anxieties and fears (such as the disapproval of *bito*) that undergird Japanese communicative style.

The socialization of fear is also described by Lisa Capps and Elinor Ochs (1995), in their study of an agoraphobic woman in Los Angeles. A central attribute of agoraphobia is a sense of having no control over one's feelings and actions (hence one gets gripped by paralyzing anxiety attacks). Capps and Ochs hypothesize that this sense of being unable to control one's feelings is, at least in part, socialized, and they examine how this might occur by analyzing the interactions that occur between Meg, the agoraphobic woman, and Beth, her eleven-year-old daughter, when Beth talks about how she managed to handle some threatening situation. Whenever this happens, Meg often reframes her daughter's story in ways that undermine Beth's control as protagonist. She does this by portraying people as fundamentally and frighteningly unpredictable, no matter what Beth may think; by casting doubt on the credibility of her daughter's memory of events; by minimizing the threatening dimension of the daughter's narrative, thereby implying that Beth has not truly surmounted danger; and by reframing situations in which Beth asserts herself as situations in which the daughter has done something embarrassing.

Although the studies by Clancy and Capps and Ochs discuss fear and not desire, it is important to remember that from another perspective, *fears are desires* – the desire to avoid shame, embarrassment, danger, punishment, and so on. Another study co-authored by Ochs (Ochs, Pontecorvo, and Fasulo 1996) specifically discusses desire. In this case, the desire is gustatory. Here, the research team investigated how children come to develop taste. One of their main findings was that children's likes and dislikes of different kinds of food are actively socialized at the dinner table.

In a comparison of dinnertime interactions in American and Italian middle-class families, Ochs, Pontecorvo, and Fasulo found that dinners at the American tables were consistently marked by oppositional stances in relation to food, with children complaining that they did not want to eat the food they were served, and parents insisting that they must. One of the reasons why these dinnertime interactions were so oppositional is that they were framed that way by parents. American parents often assumed that children would not like the same kinds of foods that they enjoyed. This could be signaled through the preparation of different dishes, some for children and others for the adults, or by remarks that invited children to align in opposition to adults. For example, when one parent presents a novel food item at the dinner table, the other might remark "I don't know if the kids'll really like it, but I'll give it to them." In addition, the tendency in American homes was to "frame dessert as what their children *want* to eat, and vegetables, meat, etc., as what their children *have* to eat" (1996: 22, emphasis in original), thereby creating a situation in which certain foods were portrayed as tasty and desirable, and others as mere nutrition, or even punishment ("Eat that celery or you'll get no dessert").

Italian families, in contrast, highlighted food as pleasure. Parents did not invite their children to adopt oppositional stances (by creating distinctions between

themselves and "the kids" in relation to food); they foregrounded the positive dimensions of the social relations that were materialized through food ("Hey look at this guys! Tonight Mamma delights us. Spaghetti with clams") and they did not portray dessert as a reward to be gained only after one has first performed an onerous duty. The results of these kinds of differences in socializing contexts is that children acquire (rather than simply "discover") different kinds of relationships to food, different kinds of tastes, and different kinds of desires.

Studies of language socialization like those by Clancy and by Ochs, Pontecorvo, and Fasulo do not discuss repression or mention Freud or psychoanalysis. No matter: this kind of work is an important and guiding example of how linguists can link with the project of discursive psychology to demonstrate how "phenomena, which traditional psychological theories have treated as 'inner processes' [such as taste, intuition, shame, or anxiety] are, in fact, constituted through social, discursive activity" (Billig 1997: 139). Therefore, "the location of desire outside the processes of dialogue and social order is not necessary" (Billig 1997: 151).

3 THE GRAMMAR OF DESIRE

In their book about how the condition of agoraphobia might be illuminated by a close examination of the way agoraphobics use language to narrate their experiences and talk about their feelings, Lisa Capps and Elinor Ochs have noted that even though therapists have long recognized the role that language plays in understanding and alleviating psychological illnesses (psychoanalysis, after all, has been known since Freud's day as "the talking cure"), the tendency in therapy is "to look *through* language rather than *at* its forms" (Capps and Ochs 1995: 186, emphasis in original). A powerful contribution that the language socialization paradigm makes to an understanding of the production of subjects is its close attention to the linguistic forms that are used to socialize children and other novices into expected roles and behaviors.

We referred above to the claim made by Capps and Ochs that Beth, the daughter of the agoraphobic woman they write about, is exposed to socializing messages that may contribute to her one day developing the condition of agoraphobia. Note that Capps and Ochs make no claims about determination or inevitability – no one can know for sure whether or not Beth will eventually become agoraphobic. What we can say, however, is that the language that gets circulated between mother and daughter has specific forms, and that these linguistic structures foreground specific desires and competencies, and background others. One of the many examples analyzed by Capps and Ochs is the following (1995: 160–1):

Meg's [the agoraphobic mother's] contributions to stories that feature Beth as a protagonist may also reinforce and even augment a view of people in general, and Beth in particular, as lacking control over their emotions and actions. In telling about her frightening encounter with a boy with a shaved head, for example, Beth frequently uses grammatical forms that emphasize the inexplicability of her feelings and actions. Beth draws on phrases and words such as "for some reason" and "just" to imbue her rendition of this experience with a sense of bewilderment:

For some *reason*, i

Throughout this accou
own fear at the sight of
But she does not come
the end of this lengthy

Why would anyone do

Meg at first laughs and

I don't know.

Capps and Ochs anal
perpetuates Beth's wo
gether, Meg and Beth
incomprehensible – a p
ever leaving the restric

Implicit in this inter
able to understand wh
The underlying struct
Noriko Akatsuka, wh
desirability; in collabo
has been applied to
caregivers use langua
Clancy 1993). In ana
Akatsuka, and Straus
according to a partic
quent, such that

DESIRABLE leads to
UNDESIRABLE lead

For example, a child
mother "I won't put
→ DESIRABLE). An e
to his child "If I see
underlying structure
the behavior of their
(getting the child to
the adult explicitly f
turned on, avoiding

Clancy, Akatsuka,
on different linguist
Japanese and Korean
occur in the form o
conditionals in whic
for example, "If you
Japanese and Korea
deontic modality is

For some *reason*, it just scared me.

Throughout this account, Beth also ponders the source of this boy's behavior and of her own fear at the sight of him. Why would anyone shave his head? Why did I feel that way? But she does not come up with answers to these questions. After much deliberation, at the end of this lengthy story, Beth turns to her mother for help:

Why would anyone do that?

Meg at first laughs and then offers the following response:

I don't know.

Capps and Ochs analyze this interaction by pointing out how Meg's response perpetuates Beth's wondering and aligns their worldviews. They observe how, together, Meg and Beth construct the perspective that people behave in ways that are incomprehensible – a perspective that directly contributes to an agoraphobic's fear of ever leaving the restricted zone in which she feels safe and secure.

Implicit in this interaction is a notion of desirability, in which it is desirable to be able to understand why people act like they do, and "scary" to not be able to do so. The underlying structures of desirability that animate talk have been elaborated by Noriko Akatsuka, who proposed an analysis of Japanese conditionals in terms of desirability; in collaboration with Patricia Clancy and Susan Strauss, this analysis has been applied to the way in which Japanese-, Korean-, and English-speaking caregivers use language to socialize children (Akatsuka 1991a, b; Akatsuka and Clancy 1993). In analyzing adult-child interactions, Akatsuka (1991b) and Clancy, Akatsuka, and Strauss (1997) have shown how speech to children is structured according to a particular contingency relationship between antecedent and consequent, such that

DESIRABLE leads to DESIRABLE

UNDESIRABLE leads to UNDESIRABLE

For example, a child who is afraid of the sound of a vacuum cleaner is told by her mother "I won't put the vacuum cleaner on if you drink all your juice" (DESIRABLE → DESIRABLE). An example of UNDESIRABLE → UNDESIRABLE is a father's warning to his child "If I see you with matches, I'll give you a spanking." Note that this underlying structure of desirability is a channel of power. Adults attempt to control the behavior of their child addressees by linking actions that are desirable for the adult (getting the child to drink her juice, having the child avoid matches) to actions that the adult explicitly frames as desirable to the child (not having the vacuum cleaner turned on, avoiding physical punishment).

Clancy, Akatsuka, and Strauss (1997) have observed that different languages rely on different linguistic forms to channel this power and frame these relationships. In Japanese and Korean, prohibitions, instructions, permissions, promises, and threats occur in the form of what they call deontic conditionals. Deontic conditionals are conditionals in which speakers specify a behavior and then evaluate it as good or bad, for example, "If you do it, it's good." This linguistic form is extremely frequent in Japanese and Korean adult-child interactions. It contrasts with the way in which deontic modality is conveyed in a language like English, where modal or modal-like

forms (such as *can*, *should*, *may*, *have to*, etc.) are used to convey speaker attitude toward the proposition being expressed. Furthermore, the conditionals, promises, threats, and warnings used by the English speakers often provided children with an explicit reason for complying with the directive that was linked to consequences that they would face ("... I'll give you a spanking"). Japanese and Korean adults, on the other hand, did not present children with this kind of information. Instead, they relied on general statements (such as "... it won't do," or "... it's scary"), which do not assert what will happen if the child does or does not accede to the adult's command to do, or stop doing, something.

In terms of language socialization, Clancy et al. (1997) provide a suggestive framework for analyzing not only how speakers encode desire in language, but also how that desire is articulated with different kinds of authority and power. While the work takes as its analytical starting point the perspective of caregivers, it could be extended to other speakers, in order to examine the way that desirability and power are disseminated across the social field. Once we understand the structures through which this occurs, we are in a better position to also understand the ways in which those structures may be challenged, resisted, changed – or entrenched.

4 LANGUAGE SOCIALIZATION IN ACTION: KALULI SERMONS AND THE PRODUCTION OF NEW SUBJECTS

The idea of entrenchment leads us to the final example that we will discuss, one that highlights the three main themes – change, desire, and the production of subjectivities – that we have been discussing throughout this chapter. Let us return to Bosavi, the home of the Kaluli. In the early 1970s, fundamentalist Christian missionaries from Australia established a mission station in Bosavi with the goal of converting this "Stone Age" population as quickly as possible (Schieffelin 2002). These missionaries viewed most traditional Bosavi cultural practices and beliefs as anathema and antithetical to their evangelical project, and they were determined to change how people looked, thought, felt, and spoke. Local men who knew some Tok Pisin were recruited as pastors, and within a relatively short period of time, these local pastors had been trained to hold frequent village church services, during which they translated and preached New Testament verses in the vernacular.⁶

Church services were the primary context in which pastors entrenched the new desires and fears that were required to transform Kaluli women and men into Christian subjects. In some ways, the language socialization strategies in sermons were pragmatically similar to those that were habitually used between caregivers and young children. In both the church and the home, for example, positive and negative imperatives directed addressees' actions and desires, and rhetorical questions were used to shame and challenge those who did not conform. There were, however, crucial differences. Caregiver speech to children focused on immediate and ongoing activities (using present imperatives, like "Go now!"). Pastor speech addressed future activities, thoughts, and desires, and it relied heavily on the Kaluli grammatical form of future imperatives ("Think in the future!"). This stress on the future was part of the Christian message that all actions and desires in the present had direct and predictable future consequences.

In addition to a heavy emphasis on threats, warnings, and promises, other techniques were used to convey speaker attitude toward the proposition being expressed. Furthermore, the conditionals, promises, threats, and warnings used by the English speakers often provided children with an explicit reason for complying with the directive that was linked to consequences that they would face ("... I'll give you a spanking"). Japanese and Korean adults, on the other hand, did not present children with this kind of information. Instead, they relied on general statements (such as "... it won't do," or "... it's scary"), which do not assert what will happen if the child does or does not accede to the adult's command to do, or stop doing, something.

Degelo's sermon in Bosavi

o:go: walafo: aundom
e dasima: no: aundo: m
today those acting like
Jesus Christ comes, t

ko:sega ge Baibo: lo: to
lalega walafo a: no: an
but if you do not me
moving away from it
(sickness/sin) will ki

Conditional threats and promises were used to convey speaker attitude toward the proposition being expressed. Furthermore, the conditionals, promises, threats, and warnings used by the English speakers often provided children with an explicit reason for complying with the directive that was linked to consequences that they would face ("... I'll give you a spanking"). Japanese and Korean adults, on the other hand, did not present children with this kind of information. Instead, they relied on general statements (such as "... it won't do," or "... it's scary"), which do not assert what will happen if the child does or does not accede to the adult's command to do, or stop doing, something.

Read for their cultural concern that they could thus be viewed as traditional. In analyzing conditional threats and promises, we noted above in our discussion of the kind are used to convey speaker attitude toward the proposition being expressed. Furthermore, the conditionals, promises, threats, and warnings used by the English speakers often provided children with an explicit reason for complying with the directive that was linked to consequences that they would face ("... I'll give you a spanking"). Japanese and Korean adults, on the other hand, did not present children with this kind of information. Instead, they relied on general statements (such as "... it won't do," or "... it's scary"), which do not assert what will happen if the child does or does not accede to the adult's command to do, or stop doing, something.

In addition to a heavy use of future imperatives, a series of new discursive techniques were used to convey temporal re-orientation. One striking innovation in this area was the shift from unelaborated, vague, third party threats (e.g., "someone will say something") as the main reason given for prohibitions, to detailed and graphic depictions of the negative consequences that would follow disapproved actions. The emphasis thus shifted from language that foregrounded social relations (anyone hearing the threat that "someone will say something" was invited to wonder who might say something and why they might say something) to language that encouraged fear of something intangible and abstract. Pastors issued conditional threats and warnings that articulated future worlds in which particular antecedent actions (such as not converting to Christianity) would have foreseeable negative consequences – usually painful death, burning Hell, and eternal torture. People were consistently warned against acting proud and strong, and they were warned what would happen if they did not follow Christian messages. For example,

Degelo's sermon in Bona Village, 1975

*o:go: walafo: aundoma:lo: o:ngo: kiso:no: siyalega tifa ya:su gelesolo: yan amiyo: e a:ma:la:yo:
e dasima:no: aundo:ma*

today those acting like they are without sin, going around proud/strong, later when Jesus Christ comes, they will never get up again

*ko:sega ge Baibo:lo: to mo:aloba:ndalega ho:len tambo ba da:da:sa:ga: ka to:go:liya: ha:na:
lalega walaf a:no: anaya:i ha:na:ga: a:ma: ge sola:ma:ib*

but if you do not measure yourself against the Bible every day but just listen; if you keep moving away from it [what the Bible says], sickness/sin will continue to get bigger and it (sickness/sin) will kill you

Conditional threats and warnings ("if you do X, Y will happen") were rare in the traditional Bosavi speaking repertoire. In language socialization activities between caregivers and children, as well as in emotionally charged talk between adults, speakers showed a strong dispreference for mentioning specific consequences if someone violated a social expectation, and they avoided articulating or taking responsibility for any implied action or outcome. On the other hand, the kinds of conditional threats and warnings used by pastors are what Clancy et al. call "prohibitions in disguise" (1997: 37), that make explicit a "logic of desirability" (Akatsuka 1991b) in which good behavior leads to rewards and bad behavior to punishment. As we noted above in our discussion of the work of these scholars, prohibitions of this kind are used to control behavior, and their syntax provides a grammar of desire and fear.

Read for their cultural content, conditionals can be examined for the categories of concern that they express (e.g. personal safety, morality, conventionality), and can thus be viewed as templates for displaying what is culturally desirable, and what is not. In analyzing conditionals, we might ask which templates are expressed and how different categories of concern play out over time, in terms of gender, age, social class, and other relevant categories. A cross-culturally interesting question might also be: what kinds of antecedents/consequences are articulated, and what is left unsaid? We could investigate categories of consequences (the "Y" in "if you do X, Y will happen") in terms of who will be affected, and how and whether such assertions are

moral, egocentric, or sociocentric from the perspective of the speaker. What are the propositions of justification and explanation?

Speech acts such as warnings and promises use specific syntactic devices, in this case, conditionals. Conditionals and the speech acts expressed through them provide a framework for using linguistic and discourse data to tap in to cultural and social categories. Cultural strategies of persuasion are linguistically and socially constructed, which means that some social groups may emphasize promising, which expresses positive desires and outcomes, while others may make habitual use of threats and warnings that express negative outcomes. In Bosavi, for example, promising is rare. The main form of social control is implicit threats – and it is these that were transformed into explicit threats by evangelist pastors.

In addition to the expanded use of future imperatives and the modified use of conditionals and threats, a third dimension of language practices also played an important role in Christian language socialization in Bosavi. This was the introduction of new speech genres, namely public prayer and confession. Both these speech genres were designed to resubjectify Kaluli by getting them to expose their private desires and hidden thoughts and actions to the pastor and the entire congregation. This was extremely problematic, and confessions in particular were resisted, largely because Kaluli had been socialized to guard their personal thoughts – not reveal them. What mattered traditionally was that one spoke appropriately, not sincerely. Pastors, however, did not refrain from directly and publicly questioning the thoughts and behavior of congregants, a situation that made most Kaluli uncomfortable and frightened. Pastors had the authority as gatekeepers and evaluators of who would be baptized and saved; thus anyone who wanted to be baptized had to comply with their new rules. This restructuring of social relationships generated new levels of fear in Bosavi society.

In terms of participant structure, talk in church services differed from the highly interactive and dialogic nature of Bosavi verbal genres. In stark contrast to all other speech genres, sermons were monologic. In addition, the behaviors exhorted through these monologues were inversions of what Kaluli traditionally valued. Bosavi pastors told people to go around softly and quietly, as though they were sick, so that they could be “healed.” They warned their congregants that displays of assertiveness, pride, competence/strength (*halaido*), and anger were barriers to becoming Christian, as were the ways of speaking, such as arguing, that were associated with such stances. Thus, precisely those stances and demeanors through which Kaluli women and men had come to know themselves as subjects were reassigned exclusively negative valences, and anyone who embodied and displayed them was seen as rejecting a Christian identity.

What was at stake in all these practices was the production of new forms of subjectivity. Traditional modes of subjection were explicitly devalued and resolutely replaced with different forms of knowledge, experience, and language. And in producing new, “good” subjects, these missionary practices simultaneously actively materialized new, “bad subjects.” This is particularly explicit in one of the expressions used to denote Christians: in Bosavi, Christians spoke about themselves as being “inside” (*us*). Those who refused to join the church, or who transgressed after conversion, were said to be “to the side” (*ha:la:ya*). Individuals “to the side” – the ones who did not respond to Christian interpellations – were refigured by the

Christians as unintelligible (in addition to the considerable understandings also generated new modes of orienting toward subjectivities).

What does viewing these new subjects entail? First, it shows us that language is more than language directed at children, but at adults, not children. Christians of them linguistic, and these subjects acquire in order to become Christians. This acquisition was socialized and entailed the learning, over time, of what we see very clearly in Christianity is not only about reproduction, but certainly had the goal of socializing its own ways of being in the world. The efforts to change Bosavi people was emphatically *not* cultural change, here resulted in change, not the way in which language socializes kinds of subjectivities, which socialization into Christianity produced materialized through and in conditional forms. These new intelligible subject. On the intelligible, “good” subjects of Christianity, and who were in

5 CONCLUSION

Throughout this chapter, we have explored perspectives that characterize the research paradigm. The example of language socialization can generate change, but also change. We want to highlight the potential of this kind of research can be problematic or unapproachable through language, and to use insights and practices that are different contexts. To document those constitutive of power and identity that materialize the social world

Christians as unintelligible (how could one not want to be healed and saved?). In addition to the considerable social fragmentation that this produced, these new understandings also generated new modes of knowing oneself as a subject, and new modes of orienting toward the forces that gave meaning and value to those subjectivities.

What does viewing these missionizing practices as language socialization show us? First, it shows us that language socialization is a perspective that can examine more than language directed at children. The language we have examined here was directed at adults, not children. Christianity consists of a number of concrete practices, many of them linguistic, and these practices were what Kaluli women and men had to acquire in order to become known to themselves and others as Christian subjects. This acquisition was socialized – it took place largely through language, and it entailed the learning, over time, of novel ways of using language. Furthermore, what we see very clearly in contexts of change like this is that language socialization is not only about reproduction – the Christian missionaries who came to Bosavi certainly had the goal of socializing the reproduction of their own habitus, their own ways of being in the world. But this reproduction entailed explicit and concerted efforts to change Bosavi people. In this case, what was socialized through language was emphatically *not* culturally predictable outcomes. On the contrary, socialization here resulted in change, not reproduction. Finally, what we see clearly in this case is the way in which language socialization is bound up with the production of particular kinds of subjectivities, which are articulated through different forms of desire. Socialization into Christianity produced new desires and new fears – all of which were materialized through and indexed by novel participant structures, speech genres, and conditional forms. These new forms did not produce only one kind of culturally intelligible subject. On the contrary, what was produced through language were intelligible, “good” subjects, and other subjects – those who refused the hailings of Christianity, and who were increasingly materialized as unintelligible, “bad” subjects.

5 CONCLUSION

Throughout this chapter, we have argued that the methodological and theoretical perspectives that characterize work on language socialization constitute a distinctive research paradigm. The examples we have discussed demonstrate some of the contributions that the paradigm can make to social theory, and they show how a focus on language socialization can generate insight into processes that effect not only reproduction, but also change. We chose to focus here on subjectivity and desire in order to highlight the potential of language socialization studies to illuminate both culturally predictable and culturally problematic subjectivities, thereby making it clear that this kind of research can be extended into domains that have traditionally appeared problematic or unapproachable for anthropologists and linguists. Socialization through language, and to use language, consists of empirically delineable understandings and practices that are disseminated across social space and enacted in situated contexts. To document those understandings and practices, and to see them as constitutive of power and invested with structures of feeling, is to chart the processes that materialize the social world.

NOTES

- 1 We mention habitus here as a kind of shorthand: the language socialization paradigm was not developed in response to Bourdieu's theories of social reproduction. Instead, it was developed as a response to the literature we discuss in the main text.
- 2 For example, "Baby talk seems to exist in every language and culture" (Fromkin and Rodman 1978: 344).
- 3 See, for example, Clancy 1986; Kulick 1992; Ochs 1985, 1988; Pye 1986; Schieffelin 1985, 1990; Watson-Gegeo and Gegeo 1986.
- 4 The term "socialization" was also used by many researchers carrying out what they called psychocultural analysis of behavior; verbal behavior was excluded, e.g., Whiting et al. 1966.
- 5 See Ochs and Schieffelin 1984, 1989, 1995; and Schieffelin and Ochs 1986a, 1986b.
- 6 Local men were easy to recruit and train as pastors largely because the Bosavi region had been neglected by the national government. The Christian mission was the only source of new and desirable goods, services, and opportunities, in addition to being a conduit of contact with outsiders and information about the outside world. Those who affiliated and became pastors benefited enormously.

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CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION

In many ways, the study of identity. The field's concern with the variety of cultural language. Thus classic linguistic socialization and status, des who produce and reproduce. Although the field did not recently, the concept has not serving less as the background meriting study in its own right symbolic resources available most flexible and pervasive. cultural anthropology draws interviews, humor, oral traditions courses – attests to the crucial formation of cultural subject

This chapter characterizes new anthropological research ing two key concepts, sameness on identity. The first of these while the second produces something unlike. Even together, however relations in which identities objective states, but phenomena. We therefore turn to the way hierarchically in social context

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